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Commanding Legality
T H E J U R I D I F I C AT I O N O F I M M I G R AT I O N
POLICY MAKING IN FRANCE
L E I L A K AWA R ,

Bowling Green State University

ABSTRACT

The emergence of constitutional review in France has attracted substantial attention from scholars of
public law. Yet little has been written about the political implications of the expansion of rights-based
review on the part of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction, the Conseil d’Etat. The argument is
made in this article that repeat litigation by French lawyers defending the cause of immigrants is an
important site for observing the symbolic power of legal forms. The analysis focuses on cases challenging
immigration-related administrative regulations and shows how the process of repeatedly adjudicating
these issues has focused attention away from litigants and their claims at the same time that it has reinforced the centrality of the Conseil d’Etat and its formalist jurisprudence in administrative governance.
This detailed examination of the practical operation of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction leads to
the surprising conclusion that this distinctly nonadversarial form of adjudication has contributed over the
long term to institutionalizing a juridiﬁcation of immigration-related administrative policy making.

INTRODUCTION

Viewed from the perspective of an American public law scholar, the engagement of
France’s Conseil d’Etat with immigration questions has the fascination of appearing
familiar in some ways and strangely unfamiliar in others. The familiarity arises from the
fact that immigration issues have become the subject of a form of legal activism on the
part of French civil society groups that is reminiscent of US public interest law. Immigration is high politics in France, and, for more than 3 decades, a small network of activ-
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ist lawyers has used litigation to defend the cause of foreigners in immigration policy
making. The strangeness resides in the legal procedures and processes through which
judicial oversight of immigration policy making is exercised. Planned litigation mainly
involves challenging administrative texts before France’s highest administrative law jurisdiction, the Conseil d’Etat, which has no parallel in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Studies of judicial politics in France have focused not on the activity of the Conseil
d’Etat but rather on the role of the Constitutional Counsel, an institution that is not
technically a court but rather a “third body” of the legislature that possesses the authority to review the constitutionality of legislation before its enactment. The assertive role
played by the French Constitutional Counsel since the early 1970s has been the subject
of several book-length treatments ðStone Sweet 1992; François 1997; Schnapper 2010Þ.
Although the Constitutional Council’s review of pending laws cannot be invoked by
individual litigants, its impact on legislative politics is unmistakable.1
The political implications of administrative review by France’s Conseil d’Etat are less
obvious. For one thing, although it is accessible to individual litigants, the Conseil d’Etat
lacks the authority to review the legality of legislation. Governments may opt to ignore
the Conseil d’Etat’s criticisms, so long as they have the votes to enact policies legislatively
rather than administratively. Indeed, scholars of immigration politics have contended
that the primary effect of administrative review of immigration policy making has been to
shift the institutional locus of policy making from the administration to the legislature
ðGuiraudon 2000Þ.
Moreover, the degree to which the Conseil d’Etat has elaborated a rights-oriented
jurisprudence in the area of immigration is open to debate. Broadly speaking, the
Conseil d’Etat has a reputation for “respecting the liberty of the administration” rather
than placing obstacles in the way of the programs pursued by the sitting government
ðLafon 1994, 138Þ. Certainly, at the level of conceptual innovation, the Conseil d’Etat
since the 1970s has made important declarations of principle in cases concerning
immigration matters ðGenevois 2009Þ. Yet some legal scholars have argued that the
Conseil d’Etat has opted for a narrow application of these principles in subsequent
cases, allowing the government to enact restrictionist policies with minimal or purely
cosmetic modiﬁcation. French law has no equivalent to the plenary power doctrine
that has stymied the development of a constitutionally based immigrant rights
jurisprudence in the United States. Nevertheless, as in the United States, a restrictionist policy framework arguably remains dominant in France’s immigration policy
making. From this perspective, immigrant rights litigation has resulted in short-term
victories but has posed little long-term obstacle to the government’s restrictionist
agenda ðLochak 2009Þ.
1. The Constitutional Council’s review generally has been invoked only by legislators. Since 2010,
its advisory opinions on questions of law may also be sought by the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour
de Cassation as they identify constitutional issues in pending individual cases.
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How precisely has this recent but important involvement with immigration issues on
the part of France’s Conseil d’Etat altered ðor failed to alterÞ the politics of immigration
in France? And how has it inﬂuenced the broader terrain of administrative governance?
Moving beyond doctrinal analysis, this article offers a detailed empirical exploration of
the practice of judicial review of immigration administration in France. It explores the
discursive possibilities that have been opened up and closed off by a system of administrative review operating with a high degree of formalism in both process and mode of
reasoning. Indeed, the study’s surprising ﬁnding is that the formalism of French administrative review has exerted a subtle but powerful inﬂuence over immigration administration. The process of repeatedly challenging immigration policies before France’s highest
administrative jurisdiction has propelled a transformation of administrative governance
in the realm of immigration away from the discretionary logic of policing and toward
a performance of bureaucratic formalism reminiscent of Weberian legal authority. The
austere and formalistic logic of French administrative legality ðsee Lasser 2004Þ, the
operative language of the Conseil d’Etat, has come to be mirrored in the language and
processes by which immigration regulations are formulated by bureaucratic agents. From
the perspective of immigrant advocates, however, this process of juridiﬁcation has
produced disappointing results for the development of immigrant rights. The lesson for
scholars of law and courts from this somewhat “exotic” example of governing with judges
is that juridiﬁcation can shift the language of governance, thus contributing to the
legitimation of state institutions, even when its impact on the substantive rights of
subordinated groups is limited.
GOVERNING WITH JUDGES

Legal frameworks and processes have come to occupy an increasingly central place in
contemporary politics across a range of national settings, according to a now wellestablished body of public law scholarship. Beginning in the early 1990s, political scientists identiﬁed the “judicialization of politics”—deﬁned in terms of the expansion of
the province of the courts and the spread of juridical processes—as an important
dimension of contemporary political life ðVallinder 1994, 91Þ. As this body of scholarship expanded, scholars offered different accounts of the causes of this phenomenon
ðHirschl 2004; Woods and Hilbink 2009Þ. Moreover, judicialization came to be understood not as an accomplishment but rather as a multilayered phenomenon whose future
development is both historically and culturally contingent ðCouso, Huneeus, and Sieder
2010; Ginsburg 2012Þ. Nevertheless, the basic approach unifying the judicialization
literature remains one of framing inquiry in terms of the judiciary’s institutional empowerment vis-à-vis other state institutions
A related line of research has been similarly focused on the expansion of legalized
politics but has moved away from an institutionally bounded conception of law in order
to study how legal frames and discourses expand across state institutions. This is a subject taken up by Gordon Silverstein in his exploration of the causes and consequences
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of what he terms the “juridiﬁcation” of politics ðSilverstein 2009Þ.2 Rejecting the notion
of an imperial judiciary imposing its will, Silverstein’s study contextualizes US Supreme
Court decisions in the second half of the 20th century within iterated patterns of interactions between the Court and other branches of the state in various areas of policy
making. Silverstein argues that this “spiraling of precedent” between courts and other
branches of government has shaped the course of American politics and American public
policy by substituting legal concepts and forms of argumentation for ordinary politics ð3Þ.
Even before the introduction of the term “juridiﬁcation” into public law scholarship,
Alec Stone Sweet’s pioneering work on the judicialization of European politics had
theorized judicial lawmaking in terms of its discursive feedback effect on the decision
making of state ofﬁcials ðStone Sweet 1999Þ. According to Stone Sweet, judicialization
should be understood as a “cyclical” and “collaborative” transfer of juridical “systems of
communication” from courts to other institutions within the state ð2000, 28Þ. By way
of illustration, his study shows that the French Constitutional Counsel’s application of
abstract review powers has not only affected lawmaking directly, by constraining the
scope of major legislative initiatives, but also led French lawmakers to incorporate the
terms of constitutional discourse into legislative debates. The Constitutional Counsel’s
review powers are limited since until recently it could only review legislation before its
enactment. Nevertheless, like the spiraling of precedent observed in the American case,
the phenomenon of the constitutionalization of French legislative politics has operated
through repeated interactions between lawmaking and law-interpreting institutions.
In a subsequent study of the judicialization of international regimes, Stone Sweet and
Brunell ð2013Þ further reﬁne this methodological point regarding the importance of
measuring “governing with judges” in terms of the propagation of argumentation frameworks across a political regime. According to the authors, judicialized governance is likely
to emerge so long as three conditions are met: political disputes are routinely brought
to courts, judges produce defensible rulings in these case, and public ofﬁcials treat the
reasons the court gives to justify rulings as having precedential effect ð62Þ. Thus, even
when governments argue that they are exempted from legal obligations for measures that
are “necessary” to achieve important public interests, the fact that they are engaging with
the court and presenting their position in terms of a distinctly juridisprudential framework effectively provides fuel for the construction of governance through law ð86Þ. In
other words, under the right conditions, routinized litigation of public policy issues holds
the potential to propel a diffusion of juridical interpretive frameworks across state
institutions within a given policy domain.
2. Silverstein emphasizes that “judicialization” captures only one part of the broader phenomenon of
judicial decisions and legal formality coming “to dominate, structure, frame, and constrain political
debate and the product of that debate” ð2009, 4Þ. His use of the term “juridiﬁcation” takes inspiration
from the work of Jürgen Habermas and signals a heightened empirical attention to the domain of
language, process, and frames of argumentation ðHabermas 1986Þ. It is in this sense that I use the term
in this article.
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Might a comparable process be observable in the world of French administrative law?
My analysis suggests that litigation of immigration issues before France’s Conseil d’Etat
has indeed fueled a juridiﬁcation of administrative governance in this area. Through
qualitative analysis of ofﬁcial ministerial archives, media coverage of administrative
responses to adverse court rulings, and interviews with administrative ofﬁcials, I document the traces left on France’s administrative world by routinized judicial engagement
with immigration issues. As I show, the propagation of juridical frameworks for good
administration takes place not only when administrative policies are challenged through
litigation but also at early stages of the administrative process, when judges and administrators work collaboratively to revise draft regulations. One contribution of the French
case study is therefore to remind scholars of law and courts that the practice of routinized
litigation in a given domain has the potential to indirectly propel a diffusion of implicit
rules and principles from courts to other state institutions, even without the need for
activists to litigate all relevant policy questions.
In addition, the case study of the Conseil d’Etat’s involvement with immigration issues
calls into question a tacit assumption of comparative public law scholarship, namely, that
governing with judges produces an inevitable expansion of individual rights.3 The
evidence suggests that has been no “rights revolution” in French immigration politics,
even as juridiﬁcation processes have penetrated deeply within immigration administration. Although the Conseil d’Etat’s 1978 GISTI decision ðholding that noncitizens have
a right to a normal family lifeÞ continues to affect family reuniﬁcation policies, French
administrative ofﬁcials claim that they do not feel themselves on the whole to be substantively constrained by judicial decisions.4 Similarly, activists seeking to expand immigrant rights have expressed disappointment with the limited extent to which the Conseil
d’Etat has asserted rights for noncitizens in its jurisprudence. The French case study
therefore suggests that, in the case of the juridiﬁcation of immigration policy administration, construction of governance through law has resulted in the development of
principles of good administration more than the development of individual rights.
In sum, intensive judicial engagement with immigration policy making is both a
relatively recent phenomenon in France and a marked departure from prior practice. For
these reasons, a case study of the interaction of the Conseil d’Etat and administrative
agencies in the realm of immigration policy questions offers a window to observe the
construction of administrative governance through the language of law. I begin my analysis by brieﬂy outlining the distinctive institutional and conceptual features of the French
system of administrative justice that differentiate it from judicial review in the Anglo3. In the literature on judicialization, rights jurisprudence, judicial review, and judicial intervention
have traditionally been associated with the expansion of judicial power, although scholars differ in how
they demonstrate the relationship between these variables, and as Woods ð2009Þ points out, a lacunae
remains regarding speciﬁc means for measuring the link between assertions of constitutional rights, on the
one hand, and increased judicial power vis-à-vis other state institutions, on the other.
4. Conseil d’Etat, 8 Décembre 1978, GISTI, Recueil Lebon, 67.
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American tradition of administrative law. Next, I offer a brief historical overview
of postwar immigration governance in France, against which the juridiﬁcation of this
area of policy making may be assessed. I then present a detailed exploration of the discursive and symbolic possibilities that have been constructed and diffused through this
distinctly French mode of engagement between administrators, litigants, and judges.
J U D I C I A L R E V I E W O F A D M I N I S T R AT I V E A C T I O N I N F R A N C E

The speciﬁc patterns of interaction that characterize the interplay among the Conseil
d’Etat and the administrative entities that it supervises are governed by a set of interlocking norms and institutions embedded within France’s civil law tradition. Before
turning to the empirical evidence concerning judicial engagement with immigration
policy administration, I provide a brief overview of how this system is organized normatively and institutionally. I focus in particular on the speciﬁc juridical avenue of petitions for abstract review of regulatory texts since this is the means of bringing immigration cases that has been used most extensively by French immigrant rights legal activists.
In France’s civil law tradition, the Conseil d’Etat is a mixed administrative-legal
authority that is technically located within the executive branch. It is staffed by a corps
of elite civil servants who are selected through an elaborate system of examinations and
trained as specialists in principles of proper administrative behavior. Originally created
by Napoleon, the Conseil d’Etat counsels the government on the drafting of laws and
regulations through a formal advisory process. Its members are also routinely seconded
to advisory positions within the administration. These advisory functions of the Conseil
d’Etat are combined with an adjudicatory authority over all government acts.
In all of its functions, the guiding principle that deﬁnes the mandate of the Conseil
d’Etat is the maintenance of Etat de droit. This concept, to a greater extent than the
Anglo-American notion of “rule of law,” focuses on the link between well-functioning
governance and the state’s mandate to serve the people and sustain ordered liberty.
Jurisprudentially, the concept has traditionally been interpreted as providing four causes
of action for challenging government acts: lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, violation of the law, or misuse of powers. According
to French principles of administrative legality, Etat de droit is preserved through strict
adherence to the hierarchy of norms, meaning that regulations and controls enunciated
by administrative authorities must remain within the avenues permissible under legislation ðinterpreted through the lens of fundamental principles of legalityÞ.5 Although it
cannot review the legality of legislation, the Conseil d’Etat is authorized to review all
applications of the law, from ministerial decrees to decisions of street-level bureaucrats.

5. Starting in the late 19th century, the Conseil d’Etat has deduced a set of “Fundamental
Principles Recognized by the Laws of the Republic,” which guide its interpretation of the legal avenues
within which the administration may act.
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A few generalized points about procedure also deserve emphasis in advance. In the
civil law tradition, in comparison to the Anglo-American common law tradition, judicial
decisions are generally brief, collegial, and unsigned. Specially assigned reporting judges,
rather than the parties, play the dominant role in researching the relevant facts and law.
In France, the judicial decisions produced by this inquisitorial system are notable for
their austere and formulaic aesthetics, typically taking the form of a single-sentence judicial syllogism that offers no explanation of the interpretative process by which a given
conclusion was reached. Decisions of the Conseil d’Etat generally do not refer to prior
decisions, nor do they explicitly lay out binding rules of general application. Jurisprudential frameworks are instead developed in the conclusions drafted by the court’s internal judicial advisor, the commissaire du gouvernement,6 and in the postdecision commentary of legal scholars.
As we shall see, the formal and formalist aesthetics of French administrative justice
have been particularly apparent in the Conseil d’Etat’s handling of litigation brought by
immigrant rights legal activists.7 Starting in the 1970s, a network of Left-leaning activists
repeatedly organized litigation against immigration-related regulatory texts using the legal
avenue of the recours pour excès de pouvoir ðappeal on the grounds of excessive powerÞ.
Unlike ordinary petitions, which are heard by administrative tribunals of ﬁrst instance,
petitions challenging the abstract legality of ministerial decrees and circulars are adjudicated directly by the Conseil d’Etat. In their petitions for judicial review, legal activists
have repeatedly invoked fundamental principles such as the right to social protection, the
right to asylum, and the right for migrants settled in France to work and to enjoy a family life. The landmark 1978 GISTI decision, in which the Conseil d’Etat enunciated a
right to family life for noncitizens, serves as a symbolic touchstone and exemplar of
what this style of adjudication might achieve.
F R E N C H I M M I G R AT I O N P O L I C Y M A K I N G , 1 9 4 5 – 7 5 :
“A Z O N E O F N O N L A W ”

To understand more concretely why it was that French immigration policy making became the target of organized litigation efforts, it is helpful to look at the postwar history
of immigration governance and the logics that directed its administration. Immigration
policy during France’s 30 “glorious years” of postwar economic growth was made by the
executive rather than the legislative branch. Between 1945 and 1975, the legislature took
no ofﬁcial action on immigration; rather, government ministries made immigration law
via unpublished memoranda that were not considered in the National Assembly. Statist
6. As of February 2009, this position has been renamed the rapporteur public.
7. Comparative law scholarship has argued that the formalism and formulaic external features of
French judicial deliberations have been designed and maintained in order to create a space for frank
internal judicial discussions, insulating them from political pressures and reﬂecting a long-standing
governmental belief in the capacity of the state to manage disputes through trained, experienced, and
expert administration ðLasser 2004Þ.
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institutions protected political elites and encouraged them to approach immigration
policy making in a technocratic manner ðTogman 2001, 81Þ. Formulated primarily by
technocratic elites within the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Interior, immigration
policy making prioritized the dual logics of centralized labor planning and policing.
In terms of fulﬁlling a labor-planning agenda, immigration policies aimed to furnish
French postwar industry with foreign workers, while at the same time protecting the
position of French nationals within the labor market. Ultimately, expediency trumped
preferences for a primarily European immigrant workforce, which was presumed to be
more racially assimilable, and France turned to its colonial subjects as an available labor
force to power its economic recovery. Starting in the mid-1950s, the state worked
informally with employers to issue work and residency permits to any immigrant who
had found stable employment, turning a blind eye to legal entry requirements. Following
a model established during the Third Republic, postwar state elites aimed to disperse
immigrants to departments across the metropole where their labor was most needed
ðNoiriel 2001Þ.
So long as it contributed to France’s economic prosperity, immigrant labor was
welcomed, but it was also heavily policed. Workers lived in specialized dormitories or in
“bidonville” shantytowns, and no serious efforts were made at social insertion; the
assumption was that guest workers were unassimilable and would one day go home
ðLochak 1985, 157Þ. Although colonial subjects had formal access to social services, many
metropolitan social welfare ofﬁces used the existence of segregated services for North
Africans to shift this population out of their purview, even when in fact the workers
qualiﬁed for support ðLewis 2007Þ. Similarly, local prefectures systematically found ways
to deny naturalization to colonial subjects who were unwanted as permanent members
of the community ðSpire 2005Þ. Immigrant workers were formally denied the right to
form legally recognized associations, and their residence was tightly controlled using an
elaborate system of identity checks and police ﬁles developed during the Third Republic ðNoiriel 2001Þ.
This system of control reached unprecedented proportions during the period of the
Algerian struggle for independence, when the administration created an entirely separate
governance apparatus for Algerian colonial subjects inside France. Nominal efforts were
made to win over the loyalty of Algerian migrant workers through the creation of a
separate system of social services. In practice, however, these services maintained close
links to the police and stood aside as auxiliary police units, operating outside of the
normal judicial or police hierarchies, were given free rein to control the North African
immigrant population ðViet 1998, 188–89Þ. Governance of the migrant worker population operated as a zone of absolute nonlaw ðHervo and Charras 1971Þ.8

8. The bitterness of the continuing debate over the nature of the dramatic protests on October 17,
1961, involving France’s Algerian-born population, and their violent suppression, demonstrates the
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Moreover, when their labor was no longer needed, immigrant workers came to be
seen by state planners as a dispensable commodity. In the 1970s, as France’s period
of postwar economic growth drew to an end, the government abruptly suspended
all worker recruitments and made it more difﬁcult for immigrants to bring family
members to France. Policy makers attempted to use immigration as an economic
“shock absorber,” reducing the population of immigrant workers so as to buffer
French workers from unemployment ðHolliﬁeld 2004Þ. Framed by technocratic
elites as a “problem” that needed attention, immigration was subordinated to labor
market concerns. The secretary of state for immigration, Lionel Stoléru, and his
counselors within the Ministry of Labor openly discussed enacting a policy of forced
returns for immigrant workers and generally demonstrated a marked “disdain for
legality” in their attempts to reduce the immigrant population through administrative decrees ðLaurens 2009Þ. Similar measures had been taken during prior economic downturns; during both the recession of the early 1920s and the depression
of the 1930s, French administrative policy makers had directed their services to
make every effort to “persuade” immigrant workers to return home ðWeil 2004; Lewis
2007Þ.
The organized litigation efforts that developed in France starting in the 1970s aimed
to challenge this absence of law from immigration policy making. The turn toward
immigration restrictionism via administrative decree was the immediate motivation for
petitioning the Conseil d’Etat to overturn government policies. But legal activism during
this period also aimed to support protests by immigrant workers, who protested restrictionist policies and also demanded a halt to police repression and the use of arbitrary
power against immigrants more generally ðGinesy-Galano 1984; Siméant 1998Þ. Beginning in the 1980s, the polarization of French immigration politics and increased legislative activity on immigration ðand hence increased administrative actionsÞ likewise
propelled organized litigation activity. The goal of legal activist efforts, for almost
40 years, has been to defend the immigrant cause by asking the Conseil d’Etat to extend
and then apply fundamental principles of law to immigration policy making.
T H E C O N S E I L D ’ E TAT ’ S C O M M A N D I N G P E R F O R M A N C E
OF FORMALISM

In the United States, one of the most striking features of immigration-centered legal
activism over the past 40 years has been its capacity to amplify conﬂict between those
who advocate on behalf of the rights of noncitizens and the administrative agencies
charged with enforcing immigration laws. Public trials were an opportunity for US cause
lawyers to attract media attention to immigrant causes, particularly through dramatic
witness testimony ðCoutin 1993Þ. Large class action lawsuits against the Immigration
extent to which French society continues to struggle with these historical conjunctures between
migration and colonial governance ðCole 2003Þ.
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and Naturalization Service and its successor, the Department of Homeland Security,
inspired administrative ofﬁcials to actively lobby Congress to limit the jurisdiction of
courts to hear such cases ðMartin 2002Þ. The “adversarial legalism” that Kagan associates
with judicial intervention in administrative affairs ðKagan 2001Þ is an accurate representation of the relationship that developed between US administrators and immigrant
rights legal activists.9
In France, the adjudication of legal challenges to immigration policies had the
opposite effect. The mobilization of law by legal activists certainly set in play a quasiritualized interaction that positioned French judges, administrators, and litigants as
juridical subjects and thus effected a juridiﬁcation of immigration policy making. Yet
the nature of this process of juridiﬁcation was distinct to its legal context. The formalistic, formulaic, and inquisitorial practices associated with the Conseil d’Etat’s system of
administrative review effectively prevented adversarial legalism and its associated features
from making an entrance onto the French political stage. Rather than performing the
parts of attacker and defender, advocates and administrators were cast in more passive
roles. In short, the adversarial relationships cultivated by the pattern of organized immigration litigation in the United States have not materialized in France.
This is not to say that French legal activists, like their US counterparts, did not seek to
use law to constrain the restrictionist tendencies of immigration policy making. Indeed,
immigrant advocates in France continue to view action from the Conseil d’Etat as one
of the few means of breaking into the “impermeable fortress” of administrative governance.10 In their position statements to the media and the general public, immigration
legal activists are openly critical of ofﬁcial immigration policies and repeatedly express
their solidarity with extreme-Left political mobilizations.
Yet, while advocates may talk of storming the citadel of administration, this adversarial tone has been almost entirely absent from the aesthetics of petitioning the Conseil
d’Etat. Legal activists are keenly aware that their petitions to the Conseil d’Etat must
conform to the formal language and condensed style of argumentation characteristic of
French administrative law. As one seasoned practitioner of immigration reform litigation put it, “If you want the Conseil d’Etat to exercise control, the key is to go slowly.
Above all, one should not be disagreeable.”11 Another advocate recalled that younger
members of the immigrant rights practice community are sometimes frustrated when

9. Class action litigation campaigns coordinated by US immigrant rights legal activists, which have
strongly colored the tone of judicial-administrative relations, represent only a small subset of the
judiciary’s sizable immigration docket. Most immigration cases in federal court are brought by
individual litigants and have provoked little in the way of explicit administrative hostility. While the
impact of individual appeals on legal doctrine is limited, these cases are often effective in providing
individuals with reprieve against harsh immigration laws ðLaw 2010Þ.
10. Interview with Philippe Waquet, June 12, 2007, Paris.
11. Interview with Philippe Waquet, June 12, 2007, Paris.
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those with more litigation experience insist on dropping audacious arguments from their
petitions on the grounds that they would not be received well by the Conseil d’Etat.12
As a rule, immigration advocates’ petitions have avoided combative language and have
maintained a moderate tone. Take as an example a 1991 petition submitted by the immigrant rights organization ELENA (European Legal Network on Asylum) against a
ministerial circular that instructed prefectures to cease issuing work authorizations to
asylum seekers. The text of the petition begins in a typically deferential and solicitous
tone: “The association here before you defers to the censure of the Conseil d’Etat the
circular which causes it harm. It solicits the Clerk of the Conseil d’Etat to assemble a
dossier of all relevant elements concerning the promulgation of this circular. It asks to be
notiﬁed of the public hearing at which the Conseil d’Etat will examine this complaint.”13
The remainder of the two-page petition includes a brief discussion of formal and
substantive legal avenues by which the circular might be found illegal. The substantive
arguments are gestural, with references to jurisprudential principles encompassed in a few
paragraphs. They explain why, according to the petitioners, the circular violated the right
to work contained in the preamble of the 1946 constitution, a right which the Conseil
d’Etat recognizes as a fundamental principle of law. The primary role of the petition was
to demonstrate that the legal challenge had sufﬁcient substance to merit the Conseil
d’Etat’s adjudicatory efforts. Jurists have learned to keep their submissions short. As one
advocate explained, “ten pages with ten different points is too long since the Conseil
d’Etat just needs one good ‘moyen’ ½legal avenue and they will consider the case.”14
Overall, I did not come across any written submissions by the parties to immigrant rights
litigation that exceeded a dozen pages, and most were ﬁve to six pages in length.
This form of bringing immigration to the law is notable not only for its deferential
tone but also for the way in which it has focused debate at the level of abstract
principles as opposed to concrete administrative behavior. In a recours pour excès de
pouvoir challenging the legality of a regulatory text immediately after its enactment
and before it has been applied, evidentiary submissions on the part of advocates are
minimal if not absent altogether. The document “stockpiling” characteristic of the
class action litigation favored by US immigrant rights advocates and wielded as a
weapon against administrators has not been a feature of French legal activism. Instead of discovering patterns and practices of street-level administrative illegality,
French advocates in their submissions to the Conseil d’Etat have invoked a substantive vision of republican social incorporation. In line with the hierarchical ontology

12. Interview with Danièle Lochak, March 2, 2007, Paris.
13. “Recours Sommaire pour l’Association ELENA France contre une circulaire de Madame le
Premier Ministre en date du 26 Septembre 1991,” Records of André Legouy, Group d’Information et
de Soutien des Immigrés, Paris.
14. Interview with Gerard Sadik, senior staff, CIMADE (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des
évacués), July 2, 2009, Paris.
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of French legal formalism, the aim has been to demonstrate that the regulatory texts
at issue were not logically in keeping with these basic principles.
Rather than being combative, petitions to the Conseil d’Etat have been explanatory in
tone, suggesting the ways in which administrative policies “misrecognize” fundamental
legal principles, such as security of residence and social inclusion. For example, when
challenging regulatory texts in the mid-1980s establishing procedures for family reuniﬁcation for resident foreign workers, the immigrant rights association GISTI ðGroupe
d’information et de soutien des travailleurs immigrésÞ opened its petition to the Conseil
d’Etat with an invocation of what it identiﬁed as essential principles for the politics of
immigration: “guaranteeing foreigners their fundamental rights against the risks of
arbitrary practices, and improving the juridical and material situation of foreigners already installed in France or authorized to reside there.”15 The petition urged the Conseil
d’Etat to undertake a rights-based reading of existing law, arguing that it embodied a
recognition of preexisting and timeless legal norms. The government’s attempts to place
conditions on family reuniﬁcation was argued to violate not only relevant legislative
authority but also the spirit of Etat de droit.
Fundamental principles of security of residence and social inclusion have also been
read by advocates into the legal regime governing asylum. For example, GISTI’s 1992
petition challenging the adequacy of asylum procedures argued that the right to work,
to social protection ðincluding access to medical careÞ, and to free legal aid must be
guaranteed to all those seeking asylum in France. Taking away the possibility of employment for those seeking asylum was argued to misrecognize the “signal characteristic” of
the refugee regime ðGISTI 1992Þ. French legal activists similarly took issue with the fact
that asylum seekers applying through the new territorial asylum procedures, unlike those
applying through the regular asylum process, were required to pay the cost of their own
interpreters.16 They argued that fragmenting the asylum regime through a diversity of
procedures would result in an overall dilution of rights. Here again, lawsuits focused
debate at the level of abstract principle rather than highlighting the shortcomings of particular administrative entities.
The increasing alignment of French law with European norms has not fundamentally altered the abstract and generalized mode of argumentation favored by French
immigrant rights advocates, who continue to generate their claims deductively from a
principled vision of the full incorporation of foreigners in an Etat de droit. Although they
do occasionally bring cases before the European Court of Human Rights, it is the
ECHR’s substantive norms that are seen as most useful. Advocates have invoked
European and international conventions to bolster their arguments for the recognition

15. “Requête et Memoire contre le decret 84-1078 du Ministre de l’Intérieur du 4 décembre
1984,” February 4, 1985; Records of André Legouy, GISTI President, Paris.
16. “Requête et Mémoire pour France Terre d’Asile et Amnesty contre la circulaire du 25 Juin
1998,” GISTI, http://www.gisti.org/doc/argumentaires/2000/asile.
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of a right to social protection as well as meaningful procedures for its realization.17 In
the words of one experienced litigator, “The ECHR is like a nuclear weapon; it is much
stronger if you don’t use it, but you always put European Convention arguments into the
Conseil d’Etat petitions.”18
Thus, it is not particular administrators or particular administrative agencies who have
been exposed to criticism when advocates challenged immigration policies. Instead
attention focused on the normative content of the texts themselves, which were argued
to “misrecognize the law” by placing conditions on the exercise of rights and creating the
potential for precariousness of residence. While US immigrant rights litigation has
frequently targeted the speciﬁc administrative agencies charged with immigration enforcement, exposing individual public ofﬁcials to scathing criticism, in France it has been
the rules that were singled out rather than those who drafted them.
Not only were administrators not the target of judicial activity in France, but
advocates and their causes also receded out of focus. Once a petition had been ﬁled and
a response from the administration had been received, juridical agency was wholly
assumed by the Conseil d’Etat. The process of ascertaining facts and interpreting the
meaning of existing norms took place outside the view of the parties. Experts working
within the Conseil d’Etat searched out the law, taking the legal avenues identiﬁed by the
parties only as a point of departure. It was also their prerogative to request evidentiary
materials, such as statistics from the relevant minister about the subject in question. In
this judicial process, wedded to the assertion of formalistic neutrality, advocates were
relegated to a passive role.
The slowness and lack of transparency of the Conseil d’Etat’s procedures has had the
effect of sapping the urgency from disputes over immigration policy. In a number of
cases, by the time the reporting judges completed their investigations into the relevant
facts and legal issues and a date for the audience was ﬁnally set, several years had passed
since the petition was initially submitted. In 1992, the vice president of the Conseil
d’Etat wrote to GISTI acknowledging that it had come to his attention that “a certain
number of your petitions are in process before the Conseil d’Etat for ﬁve years and I
have asked the Secretary General to ﬁnd out where we are with these cases. The ﬁrst
request for judgment deposed in May 1987 was judged in May 1992. For the three
others, Monsieur Errera, the reporter, has just turned in his report. They will likely be
judged before the end of the year.”19 The interesting part about the letter is that not only
had the cases been “in process” for many years but neither the vice president of the
Conseil d’Etat nor those who had submitted the petitions had any sense in the interval of
when the dossiers would eventually be made ready for judgment. The signature of the
17. See, e.g., Conseil d’Etat, Section, 23 Avril 1997, GISTI. Also, Conseil d’Etat, 14 Janvier 1998,
GISTI.
18. Interview with Jean-Eric Malabre, attorney, January 2, 2012, by telephone.
19. Letter from Marceau Long, Vice-President du Conseil d’Etat, to Danièle Lochak, GISTI
President, September 10, 1992.
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letter, “very cordially,” gives some indication of the banality of this inscrutable process
that was driven entirely by the Conseil d’Etat rather than by the parties.
Not only does the lengthy period of instruction signiﬁcantly dilute any oppositional
dynamic between the parties, but there is also no opportunity for adversarial relations to
be openly manifested once an immigration-related petition is eventually scheduled for
a brief public audience before members of the Conseil d’Etat. In the French system of
administrative justice, the audience occurs after the instructional evidence-gathering
phase is completed, and it is the only moment when the parties actually meet formally
in person. However, the audience is more similar in appearance to a business meeting
than a trial: adjudicators dress in suits rather than robes, and the room has an overall air of
courteous ennui while the reporter and commissaire du gouvernement read out their
reports.20 In general, after hearing from the reporter, the conseiller d’état who presides
over the audience may ask short clarifying questions to the representatives of the two
parties. Outside of these brief interrogatories, the parties have no opportunity to speak,
and they do not address each other directly at any point during the audience. There are
no opening or closing statements, and the drama is also dampened by the fact that the
audience will examine not just one but a series of petitions in a single sitting. When the
Conseil d’Etat issues its decision, usually several weeks after the date of the audience,
the parties are not present.
Moreover, the text of the decision is itself thoroughly imbued with the trappings of
formalism’s deductive logic. Take as an example the Conseil d’Etat’s decision of April 21,
1997, issued in response to GISTI’s challenge to a circular applying provisions of the
Second Pasqua Law allowing expulsion of foreigners for speciﬁc violations of immigration law, criminal law, or a combination of the two. The minister of interior’s circular
had sought to familiarize prefects with the various infractions contained in the law and
informed them of their authority to issue a removal order to any foreigner whose presence posed a threat to public order. GISTI had made a number of substantive arguments about why the circular exceeded the bounds of the law. The Conseil d’Etat decision responded to these allegations with a single paragraph as follows:
Whereas by the terms of ½the law as amended in 1993, a removal order may be
issued “if a foreigner’s residence permit has been retracted or not renewed, if this
retraction or refusal has been pronounced, by application of existing legislative
and regulatory dispositions, by reason of a threat to public order.” Whereas the
power thereby conferred to the administration cannot be legally exercised with
regard to a foreigner except when his residence permit has been retracted or not
renewed by application of a statutory or regulatory provision; whereas in declaring
20. The procedure for hearing a référé ðinjunctionÞ is more informal, with a single member of
the Conseil d’Etat sitting at the head of a table at which representatives of the parties and the reporter
are also seated.
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½in the circular that these measures could be taken “for reason of public order” and
that the retraction of a residence permit should not occur ½emphasis mine “except
when the title has been delivered in error, because the foreigner has a record that
must lead to the refusal of the permit demanded,” the Minister of Interior has
not enunciated dispositions that exceed the ﬁeld of application of ½the legislation
and which ½GISTI would be receivable in requesting the annulment.21
As the text of this decision illustrates, the immigration decisions of Conseil d’Etat adhere
to the cryptic and formulaic style that is a general feature of judicial decision writing in
France. The decision at ﬁrst seems to reject GISTI’s claim, but on close reading it becomes apparent that the Conseil d’Etat has interpreted the circular so as to limit its application. The Conseil d’Etat is saying that prefects may only retract a residence permit
if it had been issued in error. The last sentence signals that issuing a removal order by
virtue of a discretionary administrative decision that the individual’s removal would
beneﬁt public order, as a literal reading of the circular would seem to allow, would indeed
render the circular illegal. However, from the text of the decision alone, we cannot know
the legal reasoning by which the Conseil d’Etat deduced this result. The decision simply
gives a clear ruling that can be adopted by the administration. It is precise and technical,
eschewing dramatic ﬂourish and rigidly adhering to the image of dispassionate expertise.
Moreover, the legal solutions favored by the Conseil d’Etat offer scant opportunity for
accusing these judges of taking policy making into their own hands. While it is certainly
possible to ﬁnd differing assessments of the Conseil d’Etat’s immigration doctrine, no
one could plausibly classify its mode of argumentation as legal instrumentalism. One
favored method used by the Conseil d’Etat to align immigration-related administrative
policies with legal principles without criticizing administrators involves “emptying a
regulatory text of its venom.” This means that the terms of the regulatory text are interpreted in a way that is, from the perspective of immigrant rights advocates, “clearly
more favorable than a literal reading of the text” ðGISTI 1988, 51Þ. This is an established
way by which the Conseil d’Etat saves a text, “patching things together,” rather than
explicitly ruling against the government, and it has been used with notable frequency in
immigration cases.
Yet even when overturning immigration regulations, the language of the Conseil
d’Etat decisions has tended to be terse and dispassionate, gesturing at formalistic principles of good administration rather than asserting individual rights. For example, the same
circular discussed above also instructed prefects on how to implement another provision
of the Pasqua Law of 1993, which allowed for a foreigner given an order to depart from
the territory to be assigned to his residence if he could demonstrate that it was impossible to immediately travel to his own country or to another country. The Conseil d’Etat
interpreted and pronounced on the legality of this section of the ministerial circular with
21. Conseil d’Etat, 21 Avril 1997, GISTI.
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the following paragraph: “Whereas in permitting prefects to place under house arrest a
foreigner with an order to depart the territory who could not ‘for an objective reason, be
placed in immigration retention ðfor example, by reason of lack of spaceÞ’ ½the circular
has the effect of extending the ﬁeld of application of the house arrest provision ½of the
statute; whereas the association bringing the appeal is, thus, receivable and founded in
demanding its annulment.”22 The regulatory text was thus overturned, limiting the
authority of prefectures to place foreigners under house arrest. Yet the phrasing of the
decision did not let it appear as if one of the parties had won and the other lost. The law
had simply been corrected. One practitioner of immigrant rights litigation referred to
the members of the Conseil d’Etat as “good intellectual mechanics” who see themselves as
the “bridges of the Republic,” facilitating a well-run state, and thus the general interest
of all, by maintaining standards of good administrative practice.23
In the United States, immigration reform litigation has inspired hostility on the part of
administrative ofﬁcials. Immigration and Naturalization Service ofﬁcials actively encouraged legislators to address “the problem with judicial review as it had come to be exercised” ðMartin 2002, 322Þ. During the early 1990s, government criticisms of immigration reform litigation centered squarely on lawyers, with administrative ofﬁcials arguing
that restricting class action litigation was “critically important” to the functioning of the
agency ðCooper 1997, 1510Þ. Attempts to foreclose immigration lawsuits, which had
been unsuccessful in the early 1980s, produced a series of laws restricting judicial review
of immigration and demonstrating the extent to which legality in immigration had
moved from an ancillary theme to a major debate in the US politics of immigration.
No similar dynamic appears to have been at work in France. Immigrant rights
decisions of the Conseil d’Etat, when they did get reported in the media, were very rarely
characterized by controversy. Indeed, government responses to Conseil d’Etat pronouncements overturning immigration-related regulatory texts have offered nothing more than
acknowledgment. “The Minister will conform to the decisions of the Conseil d’Etat”
was the only response to the Conseil d’Etat decision overturning multiple provisions of
a circular on asylum procedures ðZappi 2000Þ. Similarly, “Justice has spoken the law,
and we must take it into account. But the Prime Minister asks his services to study the
margin for maneuver permitted by the decision” was the response to a decision on access
to social assistance programs ðZappi 2002Þ. In some instances, the minister announced
the same day the decision was issued that he had ordered a new regulation to be drafted
“with modiﬁcations precisely as directed” ðBissuel 2007Þ. French political life has not
been immune to polemics against judges, particularly in the context of the activities of
Left-leaning investigating magistrates ðRoussel 2002Þ, but these have not reached the
institution of the Conseil d’Etat even in the aftermath of its most far-reaching immigration decisions.
22. Conseil d’Etat, 21 Avril 1997, GISTI.
23. Interview with Philippe Waquet, June 12, 2007, Paris.
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A similar absence of controversy is notable in the way that administrators responded
to questions about how immigration reform litigation affected their work. The themes
invoked were drawn from the ideals of the French legal tradition. “The associations are
doing their job by raising problems for the government to ﬁx,” was how one former
director of juridical affairs described immigration reform litigation.24 He went on to muse
dispassionately about whether the decision of the Conseil d’Etat requiring the translation
of asylum hearings would be extended to other administrative procedures, saying that it
was “an interesting question.” Another longtime public ofﬁcial involved in immigration
administration offered a similarly intellectualized analysis of the beneﬁts of litigation,
declaring, “Juridical combat to have the hierarchy of norms respected is always necessary” ðMoreau 2009, 245Þ. This register of talking about immigration reform litigation
invokes a strongly professed belief in the hierarchy of norms and Etat de droit. The
recuperation of these themes by administrators who must repeatedly defend their policies
against legal challenges demonstrates the power of legal formalism in the French system
of administrative justice to transform adjudication from a potential opportunity for
amplifying political conﬂict into a ritualized performance of law’s authority.
F R O M P O L I C I N G TO P R O C E D U R A L I S M : J U R I D I F Y I N G F R E N C H
A D M I N I S T R AT I V E P O L I C Y M A K I N G O N I M M I G R AT I O N

An examination of the formulation of immigration texts in the wake of the Conseil
d’Etat’s engagement with these issues suggests that administrative review has effected a
“juridiﬁcation” of immigration policy making within the French administrative state. At
the same time that it has blocked opportunities for confrontation between advocates and
administrators, the recurrent adjudication of immigration policies has reinforced the
presence of the Conseil d’Etat, along with its distinct mode of reasoning, in an immigration policy-making process that previously had operated as a zone of nonlaw. In doing
so, the immigration jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat has played an important part in
what might be termed a “makeover” of French immigration administration. More than
ever before, immigration rule making mirrors the distinct procedural requirements and
formalistic modes of justiﬁcation associated with French administrative legality.
Those responsible for formulating the regulatory texts governing immigration
enforcement now pay serious attention to juridical pronouncements. Administrators,
while preparing drafts of regulatory texts, routinely compile and analyze immigrationrelated decisions of the Conseil d’Etat as well as the legal commentary that accompanies
these decisions. Particularly when adjudication has signaled a divergence between the
position of the government and that of the Conseil d’Etat, administrators have invested
extra effort in developing legal rationales for government policies. For example, when legal

24. Interview with Jean-Marie Delarue, former director, Direction des Libertés Publiques et
Affaires Juridiques, Ministry of Interior, February 21, 2007, Paris.
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advisors in the Ministry of Social Affairs began the process of drafting regulations to
implement the family reuniﬁcation provisions of the 1984 Immigration Law, they were
keenly aware of the need to align their actions with existing jurisprudence on family
reuniﬁcation, explaining to their superiors, “Taking into account the litigation which
marked earlier attempts in this domain . . . it is necessary to proceed with an in depth
juridical analysis which we will undertake incessantly.”25 That they did so is evidenced by
the substantial accumulation of these juridical documents within their archival ﬁles.
On occasion, the government has even brought in additional “seconded” members of
the Conseil d’Etat to redraft administrative texts with an eye toward identifying novel legal avenues that would make policies less likely to incite criticism on jurisprudential
grounds ðWeil 2004Þ.
In addition, government ofﬁcials have moved away from the disdain for legality
characterizing prior periods of immigration policy making and have acted to maximize the Conseil d’Etat’s involvement at earlier stages of the process by seeking out
its advice through the formal advisory procedure. For example, administrators preparing texts implementing immigration legislation in the mid-1980s found it “particularly opportune” to present not only a draft decree but also several circulars
affecting the situation of migrant families ofﬁcially to the Conseil d’Etat.26 Even
though only the decree required an advisory opinion, the “signiﬁcant jurisprudence”
concerning family rights signaled that this was an area of policy making on which
the Conseil d’Etat had staked a claim.
The government has an incentive to request and follow advisory opinions closely,
although they are nonbinding. As a member of the Conseil d’Etat explained it, “The
immigration texts are always contested and the government knows this.”27 From the
perspective of administrators, the involvement of the Conseil d’Etat in giving advice on
decrees is the primary mechanism by which they experience the “very alert, very precise,
and very searching” supervision of the administrative judge.28 But this process is far
preferable to having their regulations annulled as a result of litigation, since the advisory
opinions are not made public and the administration is free to adapt the advice as it
sees ﬁt. It is still possible that a decree or circular will be annulled because different
sections of the Conseil d’Etat handle advice and adjudication and because petitions may
call adjudicators’ attention to previously unseen legal avenues. Moreover, the government

25. Note from Jean Duliège, Direction de la Population et des Migrations, to Christian Nguyen,
Conseiller Technique au Ministre des Affaires Sociales, September 22, 1984; Box 26; Papers of Patrick
Weil; Archives d’Histoire Contemporaine, Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po; Paris.
26. Note from Christian Nguyen, Conseiller Technique au Ministre des Affaires Sociales, to
Georgina Dufoix, Ministre des Affaires Sociales, September 22, 1984; Box 26; Papers of Patrick Weil;
Archives d’Histoire Contemporaine, Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po; Paris.
27. Interview with senior member of the Conseil d’Etat, May 23, 2007, Paris.
28. Interview with senior jurist, Direction des Libertés Publiques et Affaires Juridiques, Ministry of
Interior, March 8, 2007, Paris.
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retains the option to enact immigration policy via legislative means, thereby avoiding the
coercive power of administrative review altogether. The important point to make,
however, is that immigration adjudication has contributed to routinizing consultation of
the Conseil d’Etat and its jurisprudence within the administrative process.
Over the past 4 decades, the territory on which the Conseil d’Etat has asserted its
involvement through jurisprudential development has grown to include almost all areas
of immigration policy making. It has developed an entirely new jurisprudence on
extradition, which previously was considered a political matter. It has also declared itself
capable of adjudicating the meaning of international accords governing migration, a
prerogative that previously belonged exclusively to the minister of foreign affairs. Indeed,
some commentators suggest that immigration issues have provided one of the avenues
by which the Conseil d’Etat has maintained its normative relevance when faced with
juridical competition from European jurisdictions ðLochak 1993; Abdelgawad and
Weber 2008Þ.
Yet, while the immigration jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat has maintained its
inﬂuence relative to other jurisdictions, its involvement has not radically shifted the
substance of French immigration policies. In principle, a jurisprudence that enunciates
fundamental rights for noncitizens may constrain the policy options available to public
ofﬁcials. The Conseil d’Etat’s 1978 ruling that noncitizens have a right to a normal family life has certainly exerted a strong and continuing inﬂuence over policies concerning
family regroupment ðalthough it technically does not bind legislative lawmakingÞ. In
addition, there is some evidence that the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat has on
occasion inﬂuenced policy-making debates within the administration, by equipping
administrative critics of restrictionism with arguments to counter the positions of their
enforcement-minded colleagues ðWeil 2004Þ. However, in other instances, the addition
of legality has served a primarily cosmetic purpose, enhancing the opportunities for
administrative lawyers within the bureaucracy to invent creative ways to justify restrictionist government policies. Internal administrative correspondence has on occasion
celebrated “ingenious” juridical rationales allowing policies to survive the Conseil d’Etat’s
scrutiny. Moreover, even when policies are struck down by the Conseil d’Etat, the judicial
pronouncements generally have little to say about the content of immigration policy. As
we have seen, the Conseil d’Etat’s immigration decisions often invoke general principles
of administrative legality without any explicit discussion of immigrant rights.
Indeed, the Conseil d’Etat’s immigration jurisprudence is a source of disappointment
to immigrant rights advocates. After more than 30 years of persistent litigation, French
legal activists lament that they have been unable to convince the Conseil d’Etat to adopt
their vision of republican inclusion, which holds that long-term resident foreigners
should be entitled to the same legal rights as citizens ðLochak 2009Þ. Like other defenders
of immigrant rights, legal activists are dismayed by the rightward shift in French
immigration politics, inﬂuenced by the rise of the Far Right in the early 1980s. As documented by comparative studies of immigration politics, a restrictionist and control-
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oriented paradigm remains dominant in France, with the major political parties debating the appropriate degree of border control rather than disagreeing over the merits of border closure ðDauvergne 2008; Schain 2008Þ. In the assessment of one veteran litigator,
“the cause of legality advances,” even if the decisions are not always favorable to the cause
of immigrants.29
This raises a key point of divergence between the juridiﬁcation that public law scholars
have identiﬁed within American politics, which is seen as shaping both the form and the
substantive content of policy making ðSilverstein 2009, 83Þ and the juridiﬁcation of
immigration policy making in France. The principal impact of the Conseil d’Etat’s involvement with immigration issues has been felt at the level of administrative processes.
Juridiﬁcation is visible in the formalization of the protocols used by administrators to
develop regulations as well as in their greater attentiveness during the drafting process to
formal and conceptualist modes of argumentation. This increased emphasis on legality
has been accompanied by few new substantive civil or political rights for foreigners in
either the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat or the policies formulated by administrators. The Conseil d’Etat has shown little interest in exposing itself to criticism by
challenging the dominant restrictionist immigration policy paradigm, preferring instead
to exert its inﬂuence within the administration. Some commentators suggest that it has
treated repeated opportunities to adjudicate immigration issues as a means to enhance
its prominence among European adjudicative bodies through the development of juridical categories associated with traditional French notions of good administration. Regardless of whether it has been successful in this ongoing attempt at supranational doctrinal
inﬂuence, the Conseil d’Etat’s engagement with immigration issues has contributed to
the transformation of a domain of French administrative governance that, well into the
1970s, resembled a form of colonial policing and thus operated as a blatant exception to
the ideal of Etat de droit.
C O N C LU S I O N

What does the increased presence of formal law in French immigration policy making
add to our understanding of legal politics more broadly? Throughout France’s ﬁrst 3
postwar decades, immigration policy making operated as a zone where the principles and
values of Etat de droit were much less visible than in other areas of social democratic policy making. The juridiﬁcation of immigration politics, propelled since the 1970s by sustained litigation before the Conseil d’Etat, has brought the language and procedures of
formal law into this administrative sphere. Through the process of juridiﬁcation, French
administrative institutions have become a relatively more legalistic, and thus publicly
acceptable, apparatus for the exercise of state authority over immigration and

29. Letter from Claire Waquet, attorney, to André Legouy, senior staff, GISTI, July 6, 1990;
Records of André Legouy, Group d’Information et de Soutien des Immigrés, Paris.
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immigrants. Yet these developments have occurred through engagement with France’s
distinctly formalistic system of administrative justice. The judicial appropriation of
ministerial functions that some have associated with the “rights revolution” ðEpp 1998Þ
is noticeably absent from this civil law context.
It is important to emphasize that the civil law’s tradition of austere formality does not
necessarily mean that the power of law is not at work. In his study of the contribution of
the European Court of Justice ðECJÞ to the project of European integration, Joseph
Weiler points to the importance of formalism as an explanation for the “compliance
pull” of that jurisdiction ðWeiler 1994Þ. Legal formalism’s power, in this analysis, lies in its
language of reasoned interpretation, systemic and temporal coherence, and logical deduction, as well as in the appearance of a judicial process resting above politics. National
courts responded to ECJ decisions by willingly cooperating in the administration of
community law, while the political branches of national governments adopted a relatively deferential posture toward the ECJ and its output, in part due to the performance
of a neutral and apolitical judicial process. Regardless of whether legal outputs in reality
conformed to formalistic ideals, it was the performance of formalism that contributed to
the ECJ’s power to impose its terms of discourse on policy making by national governments, who could have easily acted to reduce its powers, curtail its jurisdiction, or control
its personnel but did not do so.
This article has highlighted the pull of formalism in the context of the French system of administrative justice. Rather than amplifying adversarialism, repeated interactions between administrators, litigants, and judges enact conﬂicts over immigration policy in an abstract and dispassionate legal register. Challenges to government policies are
channeled into a system that offers no opportunity for confrontation and where those
petitioning the court are relegated to a background role. The association of judicial
activity with partisanship, so prevalent in the immigration law reform in the United
States, has not taken place in the French system of administrative review, whose formalistic register is materially and theoretically distanced from policy implementation and
where decisions are framed as a correction of administrative legality rather than a victory
for activist litigators.
At the same time that formalism has minimized the visibility of litigants, it has
nevertheless encouraged administrators to explain, justify, and defend their policies in
juridical terms. The highly stylized deductive logic of the Conseil d’Etat’s decisions, with
their scrupulous adherence to the vocabulary of the hierarchy of norms, has infused the
regulatory drafting process with a heightened sensitivity to aesthetic and rhetorical
conventions of legal form. The political impact of this juridiﬁcation of immigration at
the level of substantive immigration policy making is less apparent than the marked shift
in the forms and processes through which administrative rule making is effected. Thus,
despite its minimal impact on immigrants’ substantive rights, the juridiﬁcation of immigration policy making reinforces the centrality in administrative governance of the
Conseil d’Etat’s commanding mastery of formal law.
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